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Background: Healthcare policy-makers are expected to develop ‘evidence-based’ policies. Yet, studies have
consistently shown that, like clinical practitioners, they need to combine many varied kinds of evidence and
information derived from divergent sources. Working in the complex environment of healthcare decision-making,
they have to rely on forms of (practical, contextual) knowledge quite different from that produced by researchers. It
is therefore important to understand how and why they transform research-based evidence into the knowledge
they ultimately use.
Methods: We purposively selected four healthcare-commissioning organisations working with external agencies
that provided research-based evidence to assist with commissioning; we interviewed a total of 52 people involved
in that work. This entailed 92 interviews in total, each lasting 20–60 minutes, including 47 with policy-making
commissioners, 36 with staff of external agencies, and 9 with freelance specialists, lay representatives and local-
authority professionals. We observed 25 meetings (14 within the commissioning organisations) and reviewed
relevant documents. We analysed the data thematically using a constant comparison method with a coding
framework and developed structured summaries consisting of 20–50 pages for each case-study site. We iteratively
discussed and refined emerging findings, including cross-case analyses, in regular research team meetings with
facilitated analysis. Further details of the study and other results have been described elsewhere.
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Results: The commissioners’ role was to assess the available care provision options, develop justifiable arguments
for the preferred alternatives, and navigate them through a tortuous decision-making system with often-conflicting
internal and external opinion. In a multi-transactional environment characterised by interactive, pressurised, under-
determined decisions, this required repeated, contested sensemaking through negotiation of many sources of
evidence. Commissioners therefore had to subject research-based knowledge to multiple ‘knowledge behaviours’/
manipulations as they repeatedly re-interpreted and recrafted the available evidence while carrying out their many
roles. Two key ‘incorporative processes’ underpinned these activities, namely contextualisation of evidence and
engagement of stakeholders. We describe five Active Channels of Knowledge Transformation – Interpersonal
Relationships, People Placement, Product Deployment, Copy, Adapt and Paste, and Governance and Procedure –
that provided the organisational spaces and the mechanisms for commissioners to constantly reshape research-
based knowledge while incorporating it into the eventual policies that configured local health services.
Conclusions: Our new insights into the ways in which policy-makers and practitioners inevitably transform
research-based knowledge, rather than simply translate it, could foster more realistic and productive expectations
for the conduct and evaluation of research-informed healthcare provision.
Keywords: Evidence-based healthcare policy, research-based evidence, research implementation, knowledge
transformation, knowledge mobilisation, healthcare commissioningBackground
Introduction
We have long known that knowledge developed on the
‘high-ground’ of scientific research differs markedly from
that used in the ‘swampy lowlands’ of practice [1].
Terms such as ‘practical knowledge’ [2], ‘knowing-in-ac-
tion’ [1], ‘phronesis’ [3] and ‘knowledge-in-practice-in-
context’ [4] have all stressed this categorical difference.
Yet, over recent decades, the wave of evidence-based
practice and, in its wake, evidence-based policy and
management, has created the expectation that healthcare
should adhere to the best available scientific, research-
based knowledge. How should we resolve this paradox?
One way is to establish evidence-based practice on the
premise that healthcare professionals cannot implement
research-based evidence without inescapably turning it
into something different from its original form. If so, this
has important practical and epistemological conse-
quences that require an understanding of how and why
they do that. Yet, such transformation of knowledge has
not been widely studied. We aim here to contribute to
that understanding by exploring, within the context of
the relevant literature, the findings from a previously
published research study [5] in order to examine, in
greater depth, the transformation processes carried out
by healthcare policy-makers who were using research-
based evidence to develop local policies.Evidence is transformed when used
The evidence-based healthcare movement has height-
ened the problem of ensuring that scientifically derived
evidence is reliably passed from the researchers who
produce it to the policy-makers, managers, clinicians or
service users who apply it. Yet, there is a growingrecognition that it is naive to envisage this as the simple
transfer of knowledge across a research–practice ‘gap’
[6]. Hence, for example, the rise of the term ‘knowledge
translation’ and of sophisticated techniques to render
scientifically derived knowledge into a form in which it
can be used in practice while maintaining maximum fi-
delity to the research [7–9]. More recent approaches to
knowledge translation foster dialogue between re-
searcher and practitioner [10, 11], ranging from simple
facilitation, through ‘knowledge brokerage’ and ‘know-
ledge mobilisation’ [12, 13], to full involvement of the
eventual users of the knowledge in its very design and
conduct [14–16].
Whilst all these principles and techniques are neces-
sary, they are not sufficient. Davies et al. [14] argue that
knowledge uptake goes not only beyond ‘transfer’ but
also beyond ‘translation’ thanks to “the messy engage-
ment of multiple players with diverse sources of know-
ledge”. This statement encapsulates two crucial
principles. Firstly, the uptake of new evidence is not a
linear journey but a multidirectional, multifaceted one –
a phenomenon that has been ignored, denied or ob-
scured by over-simplified linear models of knowledge
translation [13, 17–22]. Secondly, scientifically derived
evidence is only one form of knowledge; the (often tacit)
knowledge and experience of care providers and con-
sumers must also be systematically taken into account,
along with the demands and constraints of the local con-
text. Healthcare decisions therefore entail not just scien-
tifically derived evidence but also other diverse sources
of knowledge [11, 22]. Decision-makers from the many
varied backgrounds involved in healthcare differ in how
they value those diverse forms of evidence [23], all of
which, including scientific research, have their
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ledge that ultimately informs decisions normally encom-
passes far more than the scientific evidence on which it
may originally have been based. Davies et al. [14] have
consequently declared that terms such as knowledge
‘transfer’ and ‘translation’ “misrepresent the tasks that
they seek to support” [14] and Greenhalgh and Wieringa
[24] have advocated dropping the translation metaphor
as it “constrains thinking”. Even the term ‘knowledge
mobilisation’ now seems inadequate, especially when, as
Ward [12] has commented, the literature is “curiously si-
lent” about the nature of the knowledge being mobilised.
In their observations of multi-sectoral groups formulat-
ing local policies about care for older people, Gabbay
et al. [25] described in detail their observation of the
“phenomenon of transforming a research finding accord-
ing to one’s own experience or agenda”. Based on those
case studies and their subsequent ethnographies, Gabbay
and le May [4] have portrayed the interactions through
which research-based evidence passes during clinical
policy-making as “complex social processes of knowledge
transformation”, during which they likened research-
based knowledge to a malleable ball being flipped
around a pinball machine, morphing with every impact.
A recent groundswell of evidence from diverse sources
supports this conception of knowledge transformation in
healthcare, both for clinicians and for managers. May
et al. [26] observed that research-based clinical know-
ledge is “interpreted and adapted flexibly according to
the contingent requirements of specific settings”. Similarly,
Kyratsis et al. [27], in their study of healthcare managers,
found that “[e]vidence was continuously interpreted and
(re)constructed by professional identity, organisational
role, team membership, audience and organisational
goals”. Nicolini et al. [28] observed that the healthcare
chief executives whom they shadowed continually proc-
essed and made sense of new knowledge and relied on
the skilful and nuanced weaving together of multiple in-
formal and formal sources, which necessarily led to any
research-based sources being modified in the process.
Croft and Currie, when discussing how healthcare man-
agers acquire, assimilate and transform different types of
knowledge into practice, have implied that competing
actors reconfigure it in the process [29]. Finally, Swan
et al. noted from their case studies that “[k]nowledge
does not travel untouched through social interactions;
evidence is modified at the point of decision-making”
[22]. In short, many researchers have found that
decision-makers make sense of knowledge by altering it
to fit their needs.
There is increasing confirmation that the process of
‘organisational sensemaking’ is usually a collective act;
indeed, it has been dubbed “the social life of information”
[30]. It often involves communities of practice – groupsof people who, through chatting about their shared prac-
tical interests, chew over and digest new ideas, melding
them with their practical, tacit knowledge about the
problem and its context to solve problems [31]. Know-
ledge and professional identity become deeply entwined
as they try to arrive at shared (or contested) meanings
and negotiated goals and decisions [31, 32].
The complexities of using evidence
The difficulties of making evidence-based management
decisions – let alone policy decisions – are well known
[33]. It has long been accepted that managers, like
policy-makers, are forced to work with ill-defined goals,
resources, problems and options, using whatever is to
hand to make hurried, pressurised decisions in ways that
are inimical to rational decisions based on solid evidence
[34, 35, 36]. Instead, they selectively explore, question
and interpret many types of information in light of their
existing ideas and the pressures and constraints of their
circumstances while seeking justification, often retro-
spectively, for those judgements [22, 27, 36, 37]. Yet,
those responsible for commissioning and managing
health services do not find themselves being evaluated
for the skill by which they make these intricately negoti-
ated judgements [28, 38], but according to the degree to
which they conform to externally delivered guidance and
targets based on ‘the (research) evidence’. Moreover,
there has been a self-contradictory tendency to insist
that healthcare managers, commissioners and policy-
makers take maximal account of the views and insights
of patients, clinicians and the public, while still adhering
as closely as possible to the scientifically derived evi-
dence [28] – logically incompatible aims.
Clinicians too, when making decisions about managing
their patients, tend to meld different sources and types
of knowledge. In their ethnography of primary care prac-
titioners, Gabbay and le May [4, 39] showed how highly
regarded clinicians continually recast many forms of
knowledge, including experience and local custom as
well as research-based guidelines, into their ‘mindlines’.
Mindlines are internalised, collectively reinforced, con-
textualised, often tacit, informal guidelines for handling
complex situations that allow practitioners to navigate
the intricacies of practice flexibly but efficiently. Good
professional practice relies on taking many, often con-
flicting, factors into account and rapidly and reliably
making sound judgements. Subsequent work has shown
that a wide range of clinical professionals use mindlines
[40], and yet they too are expected to follow research-
based guidance as closely as possible, a demand that
risks minimising the necessary practical and contextual
judgements that their mindlines afford them.
To summarise, we have argued that there exist strong
bodies of evidence that knowledge generated in research
Box 1 The commissioning context at the time of our
study (2012–14)
In the United Kingdom, local healthcare policy-makers, known
as NHS commissioners, are responsible for planning, contracting
and evaluating their local healthcare. Their role is to optimise
health outcomes by using the best available information to as-
sess local needs, decide priorities and strategies, and then nego-
tiate contracts for the appropriate hospital and community
services. From 2012, this function in England was executed by
clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) working in a complex en-
vironment with senior policy-makers, clinicians and local com-
munities. During our study, there were over 200 local CCGs,
each employing general practitioners (GPs) working part-time
alongside non-clinical commissioners. CCGs often relied on sup-
port from public sector Commissioning Support Units and local
government public health departments contributing, for ex-
ample, evidence reviews, help with analyses of service activity
data, project management or contract negotiation. Some CCGs
also engaged commercial and not-for-profit providers of soft-
ware tools and consultancy. At a national level, the National In-
stitute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) was a key source of
guidance about the effectiveness or otherwise of treatments,
and an ‘NHS Improving Quality’ initiative offered advice, guid-
ance and tools. NHS England and the Department of Health pro-
vided strategic direction by issuing frequent guidance and
directives. These and other support agencies, such as think-tanks
and health-professional organisations, provided much of the
research-based evidence that CCGs were expected to incorpor-
ate into their decisions. However, commissioners were also ex-
pected to fit these recommendations into their local contexts
through analysis of local data and widespread consultation with
local health professionals, patients, politicians and public.
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tion for healthcare management. The conclusion we
draw from the literature cited above is that, while there
is understandable pressure on healthcare decision-
makers (be they managers or clinicians) to act faithfully
according to scientifically derived evidence, the complex
milieus in which they operate are inimical to ‘rational’
stepwise decisions based on scientifically derived know-
ledge. In any given organisational context, research-
based evidence undergoes multiple interactions between
groups and individuals with differing ideas, needs and
values, who may reinterpret or contest research-based
evidence, combining it with many other sources and
types of evidence. Hence, the knowledge they actually
use in practice differs categorically from research-based
knowledge. Such a conclusion will come as little surprise
to anyone who has tried to implement research in
practice.
Yet, we still know remarkably little about the processes
by which research-based knowledge becomes practical
knowledge. In the belief that better understanding may
help to improve the uptake of research-based evidence
into policy and practice, our aim in this paper is to ex-
plore how, why, where and by whom research-based
knowledge is transformed during its uptake. To do so,
we use case examples from our published study of
policy-makers who have a direct influence on clinical
practice, namely National Health Service (NHS) com-
missioners (Box 1).
The organisational decision-making of healthcare
commissioners
A stream of National Institute for Health Research
(NIHR)-funded studies of NHS commissioners has con-
sistently shown their task to be inherently complex and
contextually contingent. Checkland et al. [41], for ex-
ample, described it as “messy” and “fragmented”, necessi-
tating not just extensive technical skills but also
considerable interpersonal interaction. Commissioners
had to exchange information in many directions while
managing the demands of disparate groups of profes-
sionals over whom they had little control [41]. Smith
et al. [42] described how commissioners, struggling with
a persistent lack of accurate and timely data, would ex-
pend extraordinary levels of effort to balance the devel-
opment of key long-term interpersonal networks with
the annual contractual cycle. Swan et al. [15] found that
evidence about healthcare did not ‘speak for itself’ –
commissioners’ decisions and their evidence base were
being co-developed and co-produced in tandem with
their own and others’ experiential knowledge and reliant
on several ‘inter-dependencies’ stemming from the wide
range of processes, tasks and personnel involved. Dop-
son et al. [43] found commissioners to be engaged insocial processes aimed at testing, transposing and con-
textualising evidence. These studies all confirm that
commissioners use evidence by subjecting it to social
and interpersonal processes with multiple and complex
pathways that go way beyond knowledge transfer or
translation.
In this paper, we draw upon our own NIHR-funded
study of commissioners. Our focus at the time was the
‘knowledge exchange’ between NHS commissioners and
external (mainly commercial) agencies/consultancies [15,
44, 45], but our data also revealed the complex ways in
which commissioning organisations processed new
knowledge. By examining how they used ‘research-based’
or ‘scientifically derived’ knowledge and evidence (terms
that we use here interchangeably) we elucidate the vari-
ous ways in which commissioners processed it through
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decisions. We explore in depth how, where, why and by
whom such knowledge was transformed and examine in
detail how the transformations in its nature and mean-
ing resulted from the policy-makers’ interactions with
organisational structures and processes.Methods
The study had ethical approval from South West Ethics
Committee 2 (10/H0206/52). The methods are described
in detail elsewhere [5]. They entailed eight case studies
between early 2011 and mid-2013, four of which were
English commissioning organisations where the commis-
sioners had engaged the help of commercial or not-for-
profit agencies; the other four were the external organi-
sations that were providing them with knowledge and
expertise. We focus here principally on the four case
studies of the commissioning organisations (clinical
commissioning groups). The purposive sampling varied
the length of time the commissioning organisation had
worked with those agencies as well the sites’ geograph-
ical and population characteristics and organisational
size. LW and EB interviewed 52 people one or more
times. This entailed 92 face-to-face or telephone inter-
views in total, each lasting 20–60minutes and fully tran-
scribed, 47 (lasting a total of 32.2 hours) of which were
with members of commissioning organisations – be-
tween 11 and 14 at each site – including chairs, chief ex-
ecutives, board members, clinical leads, commissioning
managers, analysts, locality leads, service managers,
community representatives and advisers. The other 45
were with interviewees from outside the commissioning
organisations: 36 employees of the external agencies, 4
freelance consultants, 3 external public-sector public
health professionals, a lay representative and a local au-
thority professional. The interview topic guide in the
commissioning organisations included questions about
the kind of information that the interviewees felt they
needed in order to carry out their commissioning roles,
how they accessed and received it, and how it contrib-
uted to their decisions. EB and LW observed 14 meet-
ings (41 hours) within the commissioning organisations,
including 7 director-level boards, 3 clinical operations
committees, 3 unscheduled-care boards and a project
board. EB, LW, CP and JHK also observed 11 meetings
and training events run or hosted by external agencies,
including other NHS organisations as well as commer-
cial consultancies. They documented the activities of
each meeting using a topic guide designed to ensure that
their notes continually addressed all the research ques-
tions. They reviewed 120 documents associated with
those meetings, 36 other internal papers, marketing
materials, press releases and reports, and 10 websites.The whole team were involved in analysing the data
thematically using a constant comparison method. EB
and LW developed an NVivo coding framework itera-
tively with the team and produced summaries consisting
of 20–50 pages for each entire case site, structured
around several domains, including models of commis-
sioning, interaction with external providers, and know-
ledge acquisition and transformation. We also developed
agreed ‘thumbnails’ that summarised key findings in
each domain. Throughout the study, we frequently and
repeatedly discussed and refined emerging findings in in-
formal discussions about the case studies and produced
cross-case analyses for all the domains. We also tested
the emerging ideas with an advisory group, whose mem-
bers had practical senior experience of commissioning as
well as research. The whole team, including where pos-
sible advisory group members, also held 8 regular face-
to-face half-day meetings with 14 intervening teleconfer-
ences, and a final whole-day facilitated analysis meeting
where we critically reviewed all the domains. Here, we
draw upon relevant instances from two of the domains
– knowledge acquisition and transformation – in all four
clinical commissioning group case studies.
Results
The use of research-based evidence
Healthcare commissioners (a term we use here to in-
clude anyone in the organisation who contributed dir-
ectly to the work of commissioning health services for
the local population) had many roles and came from a
wide range of professional backgrounds with clinical,
contractual, financial, legal, managerial or epidemio-
logical expertise that helped them to accomplish a wide
range of tasks. Some commissioners might be analysts
providing internal reports (staff with the technical ex-
pertise to, for example, evaluate key performance indica-
tors or crunch patient data, sometimes using
commercial software). Some might be redesigning pa-
tient pathways or carrying out in-depth analysis on pro-
posed contracts, others might focus on developing
business cases to inform the decisions of senior man-
agers, and some might be negotiating contracts with ser-
vice providers. The art of commissioning was to
successfully identify and assess the available options, de-
velop cohesive, compelling arguments for the preferred
alternatives and navigate them through the tortuous
decision-making system that rendered justifiable deci-
sions acceptable to a range of often-conflicting internal
and external opinion. For commissioners to gain the ne-
cessary approval they had to negotiate – as our findings
will illustrate – competing demands, priorities, hidden
agendas, power relationships, professional and personal
preferences. Therefore, to a large extent, commissioning
entailed repeatedly synthesising appropriate knowledge
Box 2 How EpiTech’s evidence was promulgated to
clinical commissioning groups and clinical staff
‘EpiTech’ was a small international company originally from a
university in the United States, marketing a software tool,
developed through decades of international academic research,
that enabled the use of GP practice-level data to generate infor-
mation about patients with a high likelihood of using health ser-
vices to a substantial degree. To provide the software, training
and the user interfaces, EpiTech relied on local branches of large
consultancy companies, whose advantage was their United
Kingdom local knowledge. However, the United Kingdom con-
sultancies were selective about the knowledge that filtered
through to commissioners, e.g. an informatics company empha-
sised the delivery of useable patient data, whereas a manage-
ment consultancy prioritised its managerial consequences, both
of which affected the use and usefulness of the knowledge that
the tool gave the commissioners. In this case study, keen local
analysts, commissioning managers and project managers (who
were dubbed locally as ‘super-users’) were selected to learn ad-
vanced analytical skills via webinars where EpiTech provided
technical training originally oriented to American healthcare but
with some attempt to contextualise it for the NHS. The super-
users’ roles were to encourage GP practice staff to use the soft-
ware when planning patient care or to design algorithms., e.g.
to help commissioners identify the right people to attend drop-
in clinics for older people.
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manteau term of satisfy and suffice [46]) the needs of
that convoluted – and often financially overstretched –
system.
Commissioners acquired information to support their
actions and decisions in a wide variety of ways [5, 44].
Sources that were assumed to be supported by the latest
research – an assumption the commissioners seldom
questioned – included written/online guidance, best-
practice summaries, directives, reports, articles, data or
surveys. These could be proactively searched or could
come directly to them from a very wide variety of na-
tional sources, such as the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence (NICE), medical royal colleges,
think tanks – mainly the King’s Fund and The Health
Foundation – and other professional organisations.
Commissioners also sought and/or received evidence-
based information indirectly through their professional
networks and from co-workers in the form of internal
summaries, reports, proposals, presentations or minutes,
or more often, through conversations and stories, which
were a fast, flexible medium suited to the constantly
shifting world of commissioning. Commissioners rarely
accessed evidence directly from the scientific literature
except where their public health departments or others
précised it for them, when it often proved inconclusive,
inapplicable or otherwise unhelpful, even when adduced
to solve a particular commissioning problem. Given,
therefore, that they were usually using multiple pre-
digested information sources, there is inevitable uncer-
tainty about the degree to which commissioners were
actually processing research-based evidence when arriv-
ing at their decisions. In this paper, we will therefore
mainly illustrate our argument about the fate of
research-based evidence by analysing the way in which
commissioners used two key examples of software tools
that had ostensibly been developed by incorporating
sound research-based clinical and epidemiological evi-
dence into their software. For anonymity, we have
named these tools ‘EpiTech’ and ‘PL-Audit’ (Boxes 2 and
3).
Knowledge behaviours and the negotiation of evidence
Whatever their role, background or task, each actor or
group of actors inevitably negotiated each bit of evidence
in their own way. (We use the term ‘negotiation’ here in
the sense, introduced by Strauss [47], of the implicit and
unconscious means of interpreting our world.) Each
actor was individually and collectively bringing into play
their own expertise, professional norms, values and
biases, including their different judgements of the signifi-
cance of the various types of available evidence. Whether
they came across research-based evidence directly or,
more often, indirectly through their co-workers, theyfirst had to make sense of it and then navigate it through
the system so that they and others could agree a way
forward for it. This often entailed weighing it up against
local data and experience that might not concur with
what the research-based evidence suggested (in which
case it was not always the latter that prevailed; local
evaluations, even small informal ones, would often be
favoured over published evidence-based guidance). Ac-
tivities that led to such decisions might involve explicit
negotiation as well as the implicit negotiation described
above. As this occurred, usually in the form of conversa-
tions, the substance of the evidence, including its re-
search content, was being handled and interpreted in
ways unique to each actor’s particular role and the per-
spectives it created.
How did the actors behave with the knowledge?
Exactly what was involved depended partly on the actors’
often-divergent aims and conflicting pressures. So, for
instance, the ‘EpiTech’ software (Box 2) was designed to
use research evidence to inform decisions, but each
actor or set of actors repeatedly reshaped what they took
to be the evidence that EpiTech was giving them. The
Box 3 How the evidence from PL-Audit was contested
and used
PL-Audit had used international standards, developed from
evidence-based expert consensus on ‘best place of care’, to cre-
ate a tool with which auditors could review patients’ notes to
assess whether they ‘qualified’ to be in their current setting (i.e.
hospital versus community care). The commissioners engaged
commercial analysts to use the PL-Audit tool in an acute trust to
identify hospital admissions that the research-based evidence
and international expert consensus groups would have deemed
unnecessary. The results suggested that 28% of patients need
not have been in hospital, a finding hotly contested by the hos-
pital and placing further strain on their already difficult relations
with the commissioners. Over the next 9 months, after the ser-
ious shortcomings of the first audit were agreed and its
methods revised, the commercial consultants were now to be
simply kept on hand in an advisory capacity. In their place, five
reviewers from the local hospital, community provider and
commissioning agency were trained to use the tool but encour-
aged to continue augmenting and consolidating the audit
methods through the experience of conducting the audit. This
involved daily discussions with senior clinicians. The second
audit concluded that the proportion of patients ‘not qualifying’
was 24%. Although similar to the earlier, rejected, results, these
findings were accepted and readily acted upon within the hos-
pital. The commissioners and hospital trust did not use the tool
again but adopted its underlying methods (without the built-in
evidence base) in their future audits elsewhere in the hospital.
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needed to ensure high evidential standards (e.g. clarify-
ing, validating, filtering and adapting the research-based
knowledge that the tool was based upon) and to provide
robust training (e.g. ‘explaining’ it in understandable
terms, ‘simplifying’ it to help potential users adopt it).
They promulgated the tool via a local consultancy whose
concern was ‘refocussing’ and ‘reorienting’ it to render it
easily accessible for use in project management or in-
formatics, and ‘reformulating’ and ‘glossing’ it to pro-
duce an attractive user interface. In contrast, the
commissioners’ analysts were expected to be ‘probing’
the outputs and their evidential basis, diving deep into
the detail, ‘evaluating’, ‘reappraising’ and ‘interpreting’
the information to fully understand the policy implica-
tions. The decision-makers needed just the headline re-
sults, ‘tweaking’ and further ‘summarising’ the findings
to support policies and contracts that they had to devise
under the pressures of limited resources and time.
Meanwhile the clinicians who were being encouraged touse the tool were ‘challenging’ whether the science-
based information it produced reflected real practice;
they were ‘contesting’ the EpiTech evidence in the light
of other empirical and experiential evidence about their
service and, in the main, ‘ignoring’ it. This example was
one of many that revealed scientifically derived evidence
being submitted to a myriad of knowledge behaviours
[25] (in quotation marks) that defied any naive model of
its simple translation or mobilisation into healthcare de-
cisions. Whether scientifically robust knowledge had, as
here, been acquired via software or via national guide-
lines, best-practice guidance or local expertise, the actors
who were processing and using it transformed it in many
different ways when faced with contradictory pres-
sures and sources of evidence. Even when an outside
observer might have regarded any initial knowledge
source as relatively robust and well-grounded, the ac-
tors renegotiated and reformulated the evidence in
their own ways so as to help them resolve the chal-
lenges presented by their particular segment of the
policy-making process.
Active channels of knowledge transformation
The multiplicity of such transformations of scientifically
based knowledge, often resulting from a series of infor-
mal conversations between key actors, presented a chal-
lenge to discern exactly where, how and why they were
happening. However, we were able to identify five dy-
namically active organisational spaces that fostered activ-
ities leading to the transformations – we have termed
these ‘active channels of knowledge transformation’
(ACKTs). These constituted the activity areas within
which the commissioners continually reshaped the evi-
dence they were working with. We describe the five
ACKTs here separately for the sake of clarity but, al-
though distinct, they are inevitably intertwined and
interlinked.
‘Interpersonal Relationships’, whereby actors ex-
changed knowledge with colleagues or associates, ap-
peared the most basic and influential ACKT, being also
implicitly nested within most of the other channels.
Manifesting itself in different ways, this channel most
often depended on informal, face-to-face encounters. In
one case study, for example, a general practitioner (GP)
commissioner noted that sitting close to the Director of
Finance and the Director of Public Health in their open
plan office had led to a high level of mutual influence.
Elsewhere, a public health consultant described how
through building personal relationships she had trans-
formed commissioners’ understanding of epidemiologi-
cally grounded needs assessment. A freelance analyst
working with another commissioning organisation
stressed the importance of informal encounters with
local GPs, which enabled her to demonstrate personally
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values and allowed them to appreciate each other’s pres-
sures and constraints:
“If you’ve got trust and if you’ve got experts in both
domains really closely engaged, literally, and by that
I mean literally sat at the same computer fiddling
around with stuff on the screen, bouncing ideas off
each other, that for me was where all these light
bulb moments came.” (Freelance analyst)
Where key relationships were poor, outside experts
fared less well, especially where they were assumed not
to share ‘public sector values’. Recognising this, the
(commercial) EpiTech consultants deployed local (NHS)
‘super-users’ to promulgate the commissioning tool ra-
ther than doing it directly themselves, so that the
personnel working directly alongside GPs did share such
values. However, even the super-users, being non-
doctors, could not fully share the (powerful) GPs’ profes-
sional aims, values and experience, and mostly failed to
convert the GPs’ perceptions of EpiTech as a (pointless)
‘clinical management tool’ into the (informative) scientif-
ically derived ‘commissioning tool’ that the commission-
ing organisation believed it to be.
‘People Placement’ was an ACKT that capitalised on
the active channel of interpersonal relationships, in
which the external personnel were deliberately placed
long-term among commissioners – ideally working
within the commissioning organisation. Examples in-
cluded a commercial agency co-locating two nurses in
hospitals to check commissioning organisation invoices
against patient notes, local commissioning support units
embedding analytic staff within their client commission-
ing organisations, and senior managers being fielded at
board meetings. Commonly, the intention behind the
People Placement ACKT was to inject knowledge into
(and also learn about) the healthcare system. Such place-
ments only worked if commissioning organisations were
receptive and if care was taken to choose the right per-
son to embed – not only considering the person’s discip-
line, expertise, technical skills and previous experience
in the care sector but also the right soft skills.
“We were very visible, and we were in the same build-
ing as the four commissioning-group leads, directors …
very available … So they regularly came to us with
questions that weren’t necessarily related to the piece
of work that we were doing with them at the time. ….
Because we had built that relationship, they didn’t feel
threatened.” (Commercial consultant)
The recurrent dialogues between the embedded con-
sultants and the local commissioners inevitably led toboth parties seeing things differently, shaping each
other’s perceptions of the information being adduced,
including the research-based evidence. Elsewhere, pla-
cing NHS staff from different organisations had a similar
effect. For example, the local reviewers in the second
PL-Audit (Box 3) came from the acute, community, so-
cial services and commissioning organisations. Working
together to use the data – and hence the research-based
evidence – conveyed by the software tool, they pooled
and shared their clinical, service and organisational-
based knowledge through daily, face-to-face debriefings.
This gave the auditors increased power in the ensuing
discussions and created new understandings within their
respective organisations. So, they were able to success-
fully bring new insights and policies based on major re-
interpretations of the evidence, which also lessened the
mutual mistrust between the organisations.
‘Product Deployment’ was an ACKT that usually
entailed the commissioners using commercially developed
software tools, e.g. for invoice validation, scenario model-
ling, audit (e.g. PL-Audit) and, most commonly, risk pre-
diction (e.g. EpiTech) that were grounded in research
findings. There were also non-electronic tools, such as a
business methods package in line with ‘managerial best
practice’. Usually, the commercial provider contributed
the method/product and the client brought additional
local knowledge. Training (which had patchy success) was
part of such Product Deployment, e.g. by webinars to
teach clients advanced operational skills for the risk-
prediction tool, by holding tutorials for local trainers, or
by face-to-face interactive demonstrations of the tool pop-
ulated with local data. Sometimes, this was very basic
training that had little impact. However, in one commis-
sioning organisation, the NHS analysts were the equal of
the sophisticated commercial providers and, working
closely with them to run and test a scenario-generating
tool, made several improvements that the commercial
provider incorporated into the next version of the soft-
ware rolled out to other clients. This was an example of
genuine knowledge exchange (and implicit knowledge
transformation) whereby both the consultants and their
NHS client benefited from changes in the way the tool
was used; however, they continued to differ as to the im-
plications of research-based evidence embedded in it and
to interpret the evidence in their differing ways.
‘Copy, Adapt and Paste’ was an important and com-
monly used ACKT whereby commissioners imported,
e.g. patient pathways, service re-designs, tools or ideas
from other organisations after subjecting them to (often
hard-negotiated) local customisation. It was encouraged
by the copious documentation on ‘best practice’ promul-
gated by the Department of Health, the King’s Fund and
other agencies. A commissioning manager described her
organisation as constantly ‘horizon scanning’ to look out
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are loads out there’. The ‘Copy, Adapt and Paste’ AKCT
was so ubiquitous in the case sites that it was sometimes
hard to trace the initial sources of innovations, few of
which were genuinely original. Moreover, each time an
innovation was appropriated into a new context, its con-
tent was further modified. For example, after the second
PL-Audit (Box 3), once the hospital staff had ‘copied,
adapted and pasted’ the audit tool, the lasting knowledge
legacy in their future audits was the underlying concept
but not the tool itself, thereby entrenching their own
clinical knowledge and discarding the United States-
derived research-based knowledge enshrined in the PL-
Audit. Commissioners in another case study, hearing
that a neighbouring county had successfully redesigned
patient pathways using a customised commercial desk-
top tool based on existing guidelines, tailored it further
to meet their own requirements. Its final incarnation
looked very different from the original in the neighbour-
ing district.
‘Governance and Procedure’ was the fifth ACKT that
we identified. Unlike the others, whereby commissioners
actively sought information, through this channel, they
often became passive recipients of information that they
were obliged to consider, however sceptically. They were
required to take note of, for example, national ‘must dos’
and guidance from statutory bodies but also to consider
local activity data and local medical input. However, they
regained some control over national requirements dur-
ing their engagement with that local input, when tussles
would emerge within this ACKT over whether or not to
implement the guidance, as happened in one site where
telehealth, a major national initiative, was opposed by in-
fluential local clinicians.
Commissioners’ work was shaped by their statutory
role as publicly accountable organisations with pre-
scribed internal structures and procedures. Probity
obliged proposals to go through several governance-and-
procedure cycles before ultimate approval. The ensuing
repeated discussion across several groups made it chal-
lenging to determine exactly who took what decisions,
when, and based on what formulation of the available in-
formation (including research-based knowledge). For in-
stance, we observed a series of meetings where a
commissioning board and its sub-committees were re-
quired to consider the operational and strategic implica-
tions of the Francis Inquiry Report (which provided
guidance on improving hospital care nationally following
a scandal about poor care.) An ex-NHS freelance con-
sultant synthesised the nearly 300 recommendations in
the report into a few categories against which the trust’s
Board could benchmark local performance. That simpli-
fication proved critically influential in the way the
commissioning organisation interpreted the lengthyreport’s recommendations and to their subsequent
mandatory reviews of ‘measuring up to Francis’.
This ACKT impacted in other ways. For example, when
the hospital (Box 3) had proven that the first PL-Audit
was misleading despite being based on research evidence,
the commissioners were unwilling to rescind the decisions
they had based on the audit since the relevant statutory
governance committees had already approved them. In
other words, the power struggle over the evidence first led
to its incorporation into commissioning decisions, then to
agreement that it misrepresented the trust’s activity and
then, within the Governance and Procedures ACKT, to its
retention despite its failings.
What all these examples have in common is that gov-
ernance and procedural requirements affected the way
information, including research-based knowledge, was
reconstructed at different stages of the process.
Incorporative processes
The transformational activities within the ACKTs were
underpinned by two crucial and omnipresent incorpor-
ative processes – contextualisation and engagement.
‘Contextualisation’, which entailed blending research-
based guidance with other sources such as local data,
professional and patient experience, or organisational
demands and constraints, was about filtering knowledge
and focussing it through a local lens. It overcame a com-
mon hurdle summarised by one commissioning manager
as: “Someone always says our system is not like that”.
Another told us:
“I think that’s the crux of our job. It’s really interest-
ing, because you read what you read, and you find
out what you can, but then it has to be applied lo-
cally. And all localities are different, you know. …
And so you have to then balance best practice
against what’s reality locally...” (Commissioning
manager)
Views varied:
“Karen: If evidence or trials show that it works else-
where then we have to believe that it can work here
too. Carol: Agreed, but we can’t assume that it will
all work here because the data elsewhere may say
200 but it won’t be 200 here. …” [The Board later
agreed to discuss said evidence with local stake-
holders before proceeding.] (Field-notes, commis-
sioning board)
Contextualisation repeatedly appeared in the Product
Deployment ACKT, as the knowledge and assumptions
built into software tools were often based on scientific-
ally derived evidence or expert consensus from abroad,
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whether by the external agency or the commissioners
themselves, decision-makers tended to dismiss such
tools – as happened in PL-Audit (Box 3), where the ap-
plication of the embedded evidence needed not only
major reconfiguration for the United Kingdom context
but also specifically for the local hospital (which trig-
gered the Copy, Adapt and Paste ACKT). Even then,
commissioners needed advice on applying the local data
outputs to their decisions; ideally, they needed access to
known and trusted ‘interpreters’ (using the Interpersonal
Relationships ACKT). In one commissioning organisa-
tion, an external analyst regularly attended meetings
(People Placement ACKT) to present a dashboard and
work through the local implications of the data with
committee members. However, elsewhere, a commis-
sioner worried that without a trustworthy interpreter the
wrong conclusions could be drawn:
“But, you know, what do you do with that data? We
know that it must be saying something to us, the fact
that a little old lady has had three falls ... But it
doesn’t tell us that she’s somebody that necessarily
needs to be assessed by the team. … We’ve now got a
waiting list for people to be assessed, and half of
them, I suspect, will be assessed and it will be de-
cided that they hadn’t really got a big problem at
all.” (GP commissioner)
Contextualisation was central to the Copy, Adapt
and Paste ACKT but also manifested itself through
the Interpersonal Relationships and People Placement
ACKTs, where through relationship-based mingling ofFig. 1 What happens in an active channel of knowledge transformationknowledge and expertise, research-based evidence
could be transformed into a more readily acceptable
form. Training on decision-support tools alone did
not suffice. The outputs had to be interpreted and
contextualised by those who understood the tools
(often the ‘analysts’) and passed on to the ‘decision-
makers’ who could digest and apply local information,
usually after a further round of contextualisation that
could include demographic, clinical, political, organ-
isational or financial considerations. When applying
national and regional mandates to local circum-
stances, contextualisation within the Governance and
Procedure ACKT entitled local stakeholders to object;
this could result in modification or rejection of the
mandates, regardless of their basis in scientifically de-
rived evidence.
‘Engagement’ meant promulgating and refining know-
ledge by informing, training or enthusing those who
might either have important information or perspectives
or be well positioned to instigate behavioural change (or
show good reason not to) and/or might tap into local or
national networks to help the initiative succeed. Natur-
ally, the more those individuals were engaged, and the
more powerful they were, the more the knowledge was
subjected to the behaviours and negotiations discussed
above. The Governance and Procedure ACKT was rich
in engagement, not least because it required stake-
holders to be explicitly consulted and to accept responsi-
bility for decisions. This was often given visibly high
priority, but took many different forms with varying suc-
cess; which stakeholders became engaged and when, and
how much power and influence they wielded – or not –
could greatly alter the degree and direction of the
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gagement was essential to the successful uptake of the
scientifically derived evidence conveyed by the second
round of PL-Audit work (Box 3) following the ‘disas-
trous’ impact of the first audit where there had been no
local clinical involvement. (Conversely, the intensive
joint working required by clinical engagement helped
more generally to remedy the fraught relationships be-
tween the hospital and its commissioning organisation.)
However, clinical engagement could also thwart naive
attempts at evidence-based policy-making; in another
case study, hostile clinicians within the commissioning
organisation initially disparaged the evidence in national
guidance supporting the introduction of telehealth. A
compromise policy, buttressed by alternative research-
based evidence that backed the clinicians’ scepticism,
was eventually agreed. The irony was that, in the face of
the two sets of contradictory research-based evidence,
the compromise was based on relatively weak local data.
Discussion
Summary of findings
Our case studies have amply confirmed, as reported in
the literature described in our introduction, that
commissioning took place in a multi-transactional milieu
resulting in interactive, pressurised, underdetermined
and rapid decisions – an environment not of contempla-
tive and logical appraisal of research-based evidence but
of continual contested sensemaking through negotiation
that involved many other sources of evidence. Our work
has enabled us to provide a finer description of the dy-
namics of this environment and its impact on knowledge
utilisation. All types of evidence, including research-
based evidence, were repeatedly (re)transformed as com-
missioners inevitably and incessantly re-interpreted and
recrafted it while carrying out their many roles. At every
stage, the analysts, managers, consultants, clinicians and
others who contributed to commissioning decisions
(analysing data, writing reports, making presentations,
chairing meetings, meeting deadlines, garnering re-
sources, persuading opponents, finding allies) had their
particular motivations, demands and constraints arising
from their various specific roles and activities. Therefore,
each actor (or group of actors) had to find their own so-
lutions for the best ways to handle such pressures and
tensions. The resultant negotiated iteration of the evi-
dence depended on their context-based needs, their ex-
perience and tacit knowledge, and their individual and/
or collective power.
In analysing where and how that process occurs, we
have postulated ‘active channels of knowledge transform-
ation’ that provided both the organisational spaces and
the mechanisms for it to happen, fundamentally affecting
how and why the evidence was processed, and by whom.Working within those ACKTs, commissioners repeatedly
subjected knowledge, including research-based knowledge,
to numerous behaviours (questioning it, reconfiguring it,
summarising it, etc.), as they negotiated and melded it
with other, often conflicting, sources and types of know-
ledge, beliefs and evidence. This enabled them to maintain
two key ‘incorporative processes’, contextualisation and
engagement, by which the knowledge was transformed as
it was absorbed into the eventual clinical policies that
shaped local health and social services (Fig. 1).
Strengths and limitations
We were able as a deliberately reflexive, multidisciplin-
ary team to draw upon a number of theoretical perspec-
tives and compare across multiple data sources
(interviews, observations and documentation) to develop
a rich picture of the ways in which managers used
research-based evidence. We were also able to iteratively
test our emerging ideas with commissioners on our ad-
visory group.
A possible limitation was that the original focus of our
study was on the way commissioners exchanged know-
ledge with external agencies. Therefore, although that
aim resulted in a great deal of data about how they sub-
sequently processed that knowledge – on which we have
drawn here – our methods were not designed to explore
all the factors. This limits our capacity to analyse in any
detail, for example, the power dynamics of the ways in
which different actors were able to treat and negotiate
knowledge or the differences in the way that they took
up different types and presentations of research-based
evidence. Crucially, we were rarely able to follow a given
item of evidence, e.g. a particular best-practice patient
pathway, through its various mutations. That would have
required extensive shadowing (which the commissioning
organisations declined) coupled with detailed discourse
analysis, which was beyond the scope of the study.
Another potential weakness may have been the tim-
ing of the study, which was disrupted by the 2012
Health and Social Care Act that restructured the
NHS, changing the commissioning arrangements.
However, we have no evidence to suggest that those
changes materially affected the generic structures and
processes we report here. Moreover, several of the au-
thors have been in positions that allow us to maintain
contact with a range of NHS commissioning organisa-
tions, and those contacts give no cause to suppose
that the key elements of our findings have altered
since our fieldwork.
Finally, we recognise that the five ACKTs that we have
identified in these case studies constitute are a beginning
to the exploration of knowledge transformation pro-
cesses rather than the last word. Other organisations will
undoubtedly have different types of ACKTs.
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Our general findings correspond to those of previous
studies [14, 22] emphasising that NHS clinical policy-
makers were working in a turbulent environment redolent
of those described in a wide range of management
contexts, where simplistic, linear-rational expectations of
evidence-based management are unrealistic [33]. We have
shown in some detail how, in the messy ‘drama’ of policy-
making [48], the actors treated and negotiated research-
based evidence to meet conflicting needs [49] through
what has elsewhere been called “pluralism and opportun-
ism” [50], “practical rationality” [51] and “tailored adap-
tation” [52]. Beyond this, we have added empirical detail
of how and why the actors responded to the demands and
constraints of that context by transforming research-based
knowledge into something they could use for the specific
task that confronted them at any given stage of what
Weiss [17] has called the “decision accretion”.
A series of recent studies by a group based at the
University of Warwick has also strongly pointed in this
direction. They found commissioning managers using
“creativity” in their “workarounds” because they could
only use policy directives or other research-based
evidence as “recipes” that required “local ingredients”
and skills to actually be put into practice [38]. Hence,
commissioning decisions became “a collective, pluralistic
and socially complex endeavour that depends fundamen-
tally on processes of co-production”, reliant on many
“interdependencies” that may occur at several stages of
an interactive “evidence journey” [15].
“Evidence use is not, then, a one-off event. It reflects
the priorities present at a particular point in time. It
is entirely plausible that different evidences will have
differing utility and weight across episodes of
innovation work. For example, [randomised con-
trolled trials] may be used as evidence when identi-
fying solutions to a problem, whereas financial data
may be used to understand feasibility. Certain types
of evidence relevant in one episode may also be ques-
tioned or disregarded in another.” [22]
Our detailed results confirm and reinforce this sugges-
tion. Our commissioners similarly co-produced their
policy deliberations and decisions through multiple
interactive processes; they mainly did so within organisa-
tional spaces that we have delineated as active channels
of knowledge transformation. Crucially, however, we
found that this led to them continually reshaping the
knowledge that underpinned their decisions, often doing
so concurrently, not just episodically as suggested in the
quotation above. Each (inter)action resulted in a re-
negotiated co-construction – a reformulation – of that
knowledge.Each actor or group of actors has their own set of
goals – often at variance with others’ – in trying to solve
a particular commissioning problem and move it to the
next stage of the process. The pressures and demands
on a clinical adviser, for example, would be different
from those on a public health analyst or contract
manager or indeed subtly divergent from another clinical
adviser. In addition to their technical and professional
knowledge and skills, each actor has what Swan et al.
[22] refer to as “situated expertise” based on the varying
experience, local knowledge, “workarounds” and so on
that they have accumulated. One way to frame our find-
ings, then, is to posit that commissioners were using
what Gabbay and le May [4] have called the “contextual
adroitness” that arises from the internalised guidance –
the mindlines – that they had collectively and individu-
ally accumulated. This would have allowed them to flex
their distinctive professional knowledge, skills and tech-
niques, their varied organisational norms, expectations
and experiences, their alternative additional evidence,
assumptions and values, and enabled them to efficiently
negotiate complex decisions. Thus, for any piece of
knowledge at any given moment in the process, each
actor could formulate their particular rendition of the
knowledge-in-practice-in-context necessary to satisfice
their contextually distinctive goals and needs [4]. It is
this use of their mindlines, we suggest, that enabled
the various actors to meld different types of know-
ledge throughout the commissioning process, allowing
them to negotiate their way through the uncertain
tensions of contradictory organisational requirements.
There was no sudden move from scientifically derived
knowledge to applied knowledge but rather a reitera-
tive series of knowledge behaviours and negotiations
that constantly altered the form, content and per-
ceived meaning of the research-based evidence under-
lying policy decisions. Not only does this give the lie
to any idea of a (one-off, passive) gap between re-
search and practice, but it also reinforces the fact that
one is dealing with (many, active) reconstructions of
the scientifically derived evidence. This has profound
consequences – although everyone would agree that
policy-makers and practitioners should try to abide by
‘the evidence’, it turns out that ‘the evidence’ is dis-
concertingly elusive. It incessantly changes such that
any research-imbued elements that existed may
become lost or distorted beyond recognition.
Besides mindlines, one could frame this shifting of the
underlying knowledge in other ways. The notion of or-
ganisational sensemaking [36], which often takes place
within communities of practice [31, 32], is also a highly
relevant approach to understanding this phenomenon.
The findings described here are consonant with the no-
tion that actors re-create or ‘perform’ knowledge as they
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ideas of performativity have been used to good effect to
argue that the reformatting and repurposing of eco-
nomic theory creates or brings into being the phenom-
ena of economics, in ways that resemble the kinds of
performances of knowledge described in our study [54,
55]. Other contributions from the field of Actor Net-
work Theory have similarly shown how different actors
within networks actively reconfigure knowledge [56, 57].
Elsewhere, Giddens’ “dialogical model” of research util-
isation proposes that knowledge is contested, negotiated
and emergent [58]. Finally, one can approach this ques-
tion from the epistemological perspective of the shift
from “propositional knowledge” to the complex “narra-
tive knowledge” that Tsoukas has described in organisa-
tional knowledge management [59].
Whatever theoretical frame one chooses, the import-
ant point is that it may indeed be worth examining more
closely how policy-makers and practitioners interactively
transform the nature and content of the evidence itself,
and what that means for the conduct and evaluation of
research-informed policy-making. Ethnographic tech-
niques such as shadowing will help to unpick exactly
how the evidence mutates through the repeated interac-
tions and to explore and test the influence of the active
channels of knowledge transformation. These and other
methods may help elicit the social psychology of organ-
isational decision-making, not just among policy-makers
but also operational managers and clinicians. This will
inevitably lead to some difficult epistemological ques-
tions about the nature of the different forms of know-
ledge, including scientifically derived knowledge, that
inform policy and practice. However, it is not simply a
question of ‘further research needed’. The practical im-
plications of taking seriously the phenomenon of know-
ledge transformation are paramount.
The processes we have described can have very differ-
ent outcomes; they may end up badly corrupting
research-based evidence, pragmatically adapting it or
contextually enhancing it. Once one recognises and ac-
cepts that those possibilities always exist, it will become
easier to develop ways to discern and realistically moni-
tor the balance between these possible outcomes. More-
over, by understanding the processes by which
knowledge is necessarily transformed, one might, rather
than naively trying to insist on fidelity, foster the art of
discerning when an adaptation maintains the essence of
the research findings in a contextually appropriate way,
and when it has become so attenuated or distorted as to
no longer reflect them. Moreover, rather than trying for-
lornly to supress the transformation processes, one
might be better placed to nurture them so as to augment
their benefits, iron out their dysfunctional aspects and
minimise their harmful effects. For example, byidentifying and enhancing the workings of key commu-
nities of practice, or indeed artificially creating them,
one might ensure that they have the appropriate mem-
bership, shared goals, mutual trust and respect to allow
a constructive discussion of the various types of evi-
dence. (This is, for example, what enabled the recipients
of the second PL-Audit to accept the evidence that they
had previously rejected.) Linked to this is the possibility
of facilitating more “respectful critical conversations”
[60], which was only patchily displayed in our case stud-
ies. This may well require the deliberate provision of
better “organisational spaces ”[61] for ACKTs to func-
tion in, and the need for a deeper understanding of the
inherent power relations, so as to enable better dialogue
between the various actors [29]. Deeper insights into
such matters will also help researchers and knowledge
brokers to become more involved than they currently do
at many more of the crucial stages of knowledge uptake
in complex organisations and to influence the inherent
transformations appropriately. A related implication for
researchers and guideline producers is that it is unrealis-
tic to expect a one-off encounter, be it an evidence re-
view, a single piece of guidance, or a meeting, to result
in the research-based evidence (or any other kind of in-
formation) making any noticeable difference.
Recognising and describing the inevitable phenomenon
of transformation may also help us evaluate the impact of
research on practice. Nearly 40 years ago, Weiss estab-
lished that policy-makers can rarely point to research that
directly informs their decisions since, as she put it, know-
ledge creeps into their deliberations as decisions gradually
accrete [62]. However, it as we have now seen, knowledge
does more than creep – it morphs. Thus, if we are to
properly discern the place of research-based knowledge in
the final policy decisions we need to do more to under-
stand how it gets changed and why. This may allow us to
more realistically evaluate the impact of the research,
which in turn may help develop more practically relevant
research. It may also enable policy-makers and practi-
tioners to face realistic expectations, receive helpful guid-
ance and be fairly evaluated about their use of research-
based evidence.
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